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THE SMEED REPORT AND ROAD PRICING: 
THE CASE OF VALLETTA, MALTA  
 
Stephen G. Isonand Maria Attard§ 
 
Abstract. In 1964 the Ministry of Transport in the UK published a 
seminal paper on Road Pricing, namely „Road Pricing: The Economic 
and Technical Possibilities‟ which became known as the Smeed 
Report, named after Reuben Smeed the Chair of the Panel on Road 
Pricing and who, at the time, was Head of Traffic and Safety Division 
within the UK Road Research Laboratory. The Report detailed 
seventeen requirements for a road pricing system, which were seen as 
either important or desirable. These requirements are as relevant 
today as they which have failed to advance beyond the drawing 
board. One scheme that has been successfully implemented recently 
in Malta is the Valletta road pricing scheme, referred to as the 
Controlled Vehicular Access (CVA) system. The aim of this paper is 
to compare the Valletta scheme against the requirements for a road 
pricing system outlined in the Smeed Report (hereinafter referred to 
as the Smeed Requirements), with the intention of ascertaining 
whether there are any lessons that can be learnt which are of benefit 
to those, world-wide, considering the introduction of a road pricing 
scheme.  
 
Introduction 
 
Road pricing aimed at addressing the issue of congestion has a long history 
in the economic literature dating back to the work of Dupuit (1844), Pigou 
(1920) and Knight (1924). Interest in road pricing was stimulated in the UK 
by the publication of what became known as the Smeed Report for the UK 
Ministry of Transport (1964) titled „Road pricing: The Economic and 
Technical Possibilities‟.  The report stated that: 
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„Charges would be in the nature of prices for using the roads, the 
prices varying from one place and time to another according to the 
costs—notably the congestion costs ― involved in driving in a 
particular area at a particular time.‟ 
 
It goes on to state, in the introduction to the report, that „when a pricing 
system is used on the roads, a useful general rule upon which to base 
prices is that the road user should pay a sum equal to the costs he imposes 
upon others‟ (Ministry of Transport, 1964). An economic rationale for road 
pricing, while important does not necessarily result in public acceptance 
and there is also the issue of the operational requirements of a road pricing 
scheme.   
 
A number of schemes exist worldwide, most notably in Central London 
and Singapore and Stockholm. Other schemes have been considered but 
have failed to materialise in cities such as Edinburgh and Cambridge. One 
scheme that was introduced without a great deal of publicity was the 
Controlled Vehicular Access (CVA) system in Valletta, Malta. This road 
pricing scheme was introduced on 1st May 2007 replacing what was known 
as a V-licence, an annual charge over and above the annual road licence, 
required to enter the city.  
 
The aim of this paper is to compare the Valletta scheme against the Smeed 
Requirements, with the intention of ascertaining whether there are any 
lessons that can be learnt which are of benefit to those authorities, world-
wide, considering the introduction of a road pricing scheme.  
 
The following section outlines the basic economic underpinning of road 
pricing and section 3 details what the Smeed Report viewed as being the 
most important requirements for a workable road pricing scheme. Section 4 
briefly describes the Maltese road pricing scheme and section 5 seeks to use 
the Smeed criteria as a means of analysing that road pricing scheme. 
Section 6 offers a number of conclusions.   
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The Economic Underpinnings of Road Pricing  
 
Simple economic theory, as put forward by Walters (1961) can be used to 
analyse the basic issues surrounding road pricing. In Figure 1 the 
horizontal axis measures the flow of traffic in terms of vehicles per hour 
along a particular road and the vertical axis relates to motorists generalised 
costs namely, the cost of fuel, wear and tear of the vehicle and the time 
taken to complete a particular journey.  As the flow of traffic increases the 
Marginal Private Cost (MPC) of motoring also increases, due to the 
additional time taken, with time having a monetary cost.  
 
Figure 1 
The Basic Economics of Congestion and Road Pricing 
 
 
Assuming motorists behave rationally then they will equate MPC with 
the Marginal Benefits (MB), as measured by the demand curve. As 
such, there is equilibrium, at point „d‟ with a flow of traffic equal to „F1‟ 
at a cost of „C1‟ to motorists. At a flow of „F1‟ motorists have not taken 
into account the congestion costs. Congestion costs are defined by 
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Santos (2005) as „the dead-weight loss of inefficient pricing of scarce 
road resources‟. The marginal social cost (MSC) curve measures the 
MPC plus congestion and at a flow of traffic „F1‟ congestion can be seen 
as „cd‟ in Figure 1.    
In order to take account of congestion the MSC curve should be equated to 
MB represented by point a in the Figure. In order to achieve this point, the 
flow of traffic should be reduced to „F2‟ and this could be achieved by 
introducing a road user charge of „ab‟. This would increase the cost of 
motoring to „C2‟ and remove the dead-weight welfare loss area represented 
by „adc‟. The introduction of a road price as in Figure 1 would lead to an 
amount of revenue equivalent to „C2abe‟. See Ison (2004) for a more 
detailed account of the economics underpinning road pricing.  
 
While the economics of road pricing, as outlined above, is relatively simple, 
the transfer of theory into practice is more problematic. Placing to one side 
the issue of public and therefore political acceptance (see Ison, 2000 and 
2005 for a detailed account of these issues) the operational requirements are 
also worthy of discussion.  
 
The Smeed Requirements of a Road Pricing Scheme 
 
In 1962, the Smeed Panel was set up by the Ministry of Transport in the UK 
tasked with studying the technical feasibility of options for improving the 
price system in relation to the use of roads and the associated economic 
considerations. As pointed out by the Smeed Panel, there was no 
requirement to consider either the social or the political aspects of such a 
measure, as the technical, economic, social and political aspects are 
inextricably linked. 
 
In the Forward to the Smeed Report, it was stated that „Economists have 
claimed that considerable net benefits could accrue to the nation if vehicle 
owners had to pay higher charges or taxes when they used congested roads 
than when they use uncongested ones‟.  
 
The Smeed Report, which was published in 1964, among other things had 
set out a list of what it perceived to be the operational requirements of a 
road pricing system.  The list as it said „forms the basic specification for a 
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road pricing system‟ and comprised nine requirements regarded as being 
important (Ministry of Transport, 1964:7). In addition, a further eight 
requirements were seen as being desirable. This list has been subsequently 
added to by others (see May, 1992 cited in Santos, 2005). The important 
requirements of a road pricing system were seen as follows (the list being 
taken verbatim from the Smeed Report (1964: p7): 
 Charges should be closely related to the amount of use made of the 
roads. 
 It should be possible to vary the prices to some extent for different roads 
(or areas), at different times of the day, week or year, and for different 
classes of vehicle. 
 Prices should be stable and readily ascertainable by road users before 
they embark upon a journey. 
 Payment in advance should be possible, although credit facilities may 
also be permissible under certain conditions. 
 The incidence of the system upon individual road users should be 
accepted as fair. 
 The method should be simple for road users to understand. 
 Any equipment used should possess a high degree of reliability. 
 It should be reasonably free from the possibility of fraud and evasion, 
both deliberate and unintentional. 
 It should be capable of being applied, if necessary, to the whole country 
and to a vehicle population expected to rise to 30 million. In 1964 the 
number of private car licensed was 7.2 million, a figure that had 
increased to over 27 million in 2008 (Department for Transport, 2009). 
 
Eight additional requirements were considered desirable, although not so 
important as listed below: 
 Payment should be possible in small amounts and at fairly frequent 
intervals, say amounts not exceeding £5 and intervals not exceeding one 
month. This does not exclude payment in larger amounts where 
preferred. 
 Drivers in high-cost areas should be made aware of the rate they are 
incurring. 
 At the same time the attention of drivers should not be unduly diverted 
from their other responsibilities. 
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 The method should be applicable without difficulty to road users 
entering from abroad. 
 Enforcement measures should impose as little extra work on the police 
force as possible and should therefore lie within the capacity of traffic 
wardens. 
 It should be preferable if the method could also be used to charge for 
street parking. 
 The method should, if possible, indicate the strength of demand for 
road space in different places so as to give guidance to the planning of 
new road improvements. 
 The method should be amenable to gradual introduction commencing 
with an experimental phase. 
 
Other criteria have been subsequently added including: 
 The need for drivers‟ privacy. 
 The ability of drivers to be able to check the balance on their account. 
 The integration of technology such that the system should be integrated 
with other technologies (May, 1992 cited in Santos, 2005). 
 
This paper will follow, what the Smeed Report, had referred to as the nine 
„most important requirements‟ of a road pricing system plus three of the 
additional requirements, namely how any scheme deals with those 
entering from abroad, road user privacy and the integration of technology.  
Before benchmarking the Valletta CVA system against the Smeed 
Requirements outlined in the previous section, it is worth exploring how 
many of the nine most important Smeed Requirements have been complied 
with in road pricing schemes that have been implemented or tested 
elsewhere and relating these to the economics of road pricing, where 
possible.  
 
Requirement 1 presents a complex scenario for any authority considering 
the introduction of a road pricing scheme. Since rather than a set amount 
for entering a charging zone, as with the £8 charge for entering the London 
congestion zone between the hours of 7am and 6.30pm, the charge would 
need to vary according to road usage. The most obvious way being of 
achieving this, according to the Smeed Report, would be to vary charges 
according to time or distance travelled. 
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 Requirement 2 also introduces an element of complexity since it states that 
the charge should be variable depending on different roads and the time of 
day, week or in fact year and thus accounting for the spatial and temporal 
differences in the occurrence of congestion. In terms of Figure 1 this would 
mean charging „ab‟ if demand was as seen and the flow of traffic was „F1‟. 
This would remove the welfare loss area of „acd‟. Demand is however 
„derived‟ and as such if it were to reduce then, according the Requirement 
1, the charge should also reduce. In fact, if demand was such that traffic 
flow was between „0‟ and „F3‟, then there should be no charge, given that 
there is no divergence between MPC and MSC.  
 
In terms of schemes that have been implemented or considered then the 
Cambridge congestion metering scheme that was trialled in the early 1990‟s 
had generated a great deal of interest given the fact that a basic tenet of the 
scheme was that it aimed to charge for congestion whenever and wherever 
it appeared. The charge would vary based on a combination of time and 
distance travelled indicating that the particular vehicle was in a congested 
situation.  Congestion, for example, was seen to be a vehicle failing to travel 
half a kilometre in a three minute period (see Ison, 1996 for more details).  
 
While it could be argued that the Cambridge congestion metering scheme 
had merit in terms of getting somewhat close to the economic ideal set out 
in Figure 1, it also contained certain weaknesses not least in terms of Smeed 
Requirement 3. This requirement said the price should be stable and 
ascertainable before a journey is undertaken. With congestion metering, the 
charge would occur when congestion was being experienced and as such it 
would not be possible to ascertain the charge prior to undertaking the 
journey, it being an ex-post payment. As such, this creates a difficulty in 
terms of the compatibility between Smeed Requirement 2 and 3. With other 
schemes prices are stable and readily ascertainable.  
 
For the reasons detailed above and because of the level of sophistication 
associated with the scheme the Cambridge County Council had abandoned 
the idea of introducing congestion metering in 1993.  
  
In terms of Requirement 4 and payment then schemes like the London 
congestion charging scheme have made it very easy to make payments in 
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advance. Payment can be made by phone, the internet, at shops and petrol 
stations. There are 150 pay-points at retail locations, 100 machines in car 
parks, over 100 BT internet kiosks within the zone and more than 1,500 
retail locations.  
 
The issue of fairness, and requirement 5, is one of the difficult issues when 
considering road pricing. The introduction of any road pricing scheme 
could be considered as unfair since relatively poor road users are asked to 
pay the same road price as relatively rich road users. It may be possible to 
deal with the issue of fairness through the use of exemptions. Equally, the 
use of revenue from road pricing can be put forward as a means of 
addressing the situation. In terms of Figure 1, the revenue can be identified 
as „C2abe‟ and this needs to be carefully utilised not least since there are 
primarily two groups affected by the introduction of a charge, namely 
those motorists who: 
 continue to use their vehicle after the charge is introduced, and 
therefore have to pay the road price; 
 are priced off the road. 
 
The UK government was aware of this when considering the legislation 
surrounding road pricing. In the Department for Transport consultation 
paper „Breaking the Logjam‟ it stated that „local authorities which bring 
forward pilot road user charging schemes should be able to retain 100 per 
cent of the net revenue generated for at least ten years from the 
implementation of a scheme ― provided that there are worthwhile 
transport-related projects to be funded‟ (Department of the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions, 1998).  
 
Relating to Requirement 6 and simplicity, Trevik (2003) suggests that when 
implementing a road pricing scheme, then starting with a crude system is 
most likely to succeed. This can be refined and developed in time. The 
ROCOL study (2000) in the UK suggested that any Mayor considering 
implementation of a road pricing scheme „brought forward for early 
implementation would have to use less advanced technology and proven 
systems, with an eye to compatibility with eventual development into a 
more sophisticated electronic scheme (House of Commons Transport 
Committee, 2003), keeping it simple for road users to understand. There is 
The Smeed Report and Road Pricing: The Case of Valletta, Malta  
9 
 
another dimension in terms of keeping it simple, namely as stated by Rom 
(1994) „Citizens are understandably sceptical of complicated governmental 
programs. Congestion pricing programs that do not rely on complex 
strategies of implementation will be more politically attractive than those 
that do‟. Borins (1988) follows a similar line when he argues that the 
experience from the Hong Kong experiment reveals that a sophisticated 
road pricing scheme „may be difficult, perhaps even impossible, to 
introduce in a democratic urban polity‟. 
 
Requirement 7 relates to reliability. Reliability is important not least in 
terms of the need to „sell‟ any road pricing scheme to the public. This may 
mean simply getting the scheme in place, in the first instance, with no 
attempt to change driver behaviour. According to Santos (2005) the 
automatic number plate recognition software used by the London scheme 
has a 90 per cent accuracy.   
 
A scheme that is free from fraud and evasion was given as the 8th 
Requirement. With the implementation of any road pricing scheme there is 
a real need to avoid fraud or evasion, since both would bring the scheme 
into disrepute. In terms of the London Congestion Charging then a scheme 
involving the pre-registration of the vehicle registration number on a 
specific data base is open to potential fraud and evasion. This requires a 
system of penalty charge notices. A national scheme would require a 
particular type of technology and certainly not the type of scheme in 
operation in London. Ochieng et al (2010) provide a detailed account of 
current feasible technologies in this area. One scheme that has been 
successfully implemented recently however, is the Valletta road pricing 
scheme in Malta. The following section provides a brief background to the 
scheme before a comparison between the scheme and the Smeed 
Requirements is undertaken.  
 
Brief Background to the Valletta Road Pricing Scheme 
Malta is an island state, and in fact one of the smallest nations in the 
European Union. It includes the islands of Malta, Gozo and Comino and 
comprises a total land area of 316 km2 with a population of 410,290, one of 
the highest population densities of all Member States (National Statistics 
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Office, 2010a). It has 297,776 licensed vehicles on the road of which 76.3 per 
cent are private vehicles and it has one of the highest rates of motorization 
in Europe (National Statistics Office, 2010b). In addition, it has some 2,227 
km of road infrastructure. With increased private car use, the limited road 
infrastructure and the realisation that supply could not keep pace with 
demand congestion was increasingly becoming a problem. This was 
particularly acute in the historic city of Valletta, the capital and Central 
Business District. It is a city with a day-time population of 50,000, a figure 
that reduces to 7,000 out of working hours. 
 
Figure 2 provides a map of Valletta and its suburb Floriana which as can be 
seen are located on a peninsula, sitting between two natural harbours. 
Access is limited, and around 35,000 vehicles pass through Floriana on a 
daily basis.  
Figure 2 
The Location of Valletta and Floriana 
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The problem of congestion within the fortified city of Valletta has been 
recognised for a number of years, so much so that the Government 
introduced what became known as the V-licence in the 1960‟s providing 
access for vehicle owners into Valletta, initially for an annual payment of 
€23, increased to €46 in the mid 1990‟s. Over time this measure became a 
means of generating revenue rather than a means to manage demand for 
road space.  
 
In response to this on 1st May 2007 Valletta introduced a road pricing 
scheme. The issues surrounding implementation have been documented 
elsewhere, and as such will not be detailed in this paper.  
 
There is however a need to provide background information on the 
Valletta road pricing scheme. Based on Attard and Ison (2010) the road 
pricing scheme, or Controlled Vehicular Access (CVA) system as it is called 
is based on the principle of timed access. Hourly charges are applied after 
the first 30 minutes (with a maximum capping per day of approximately 
€6) within the zone. Cameras monitor vehicles entering and exiting the 
zone and a charge is calculated. The objective of the scheme is to reduce 
commuter traffic and its resulting peak hour congestion, and to re-
distribute traffic to shorter trips throughout the day. The scheme uses 
similar technology to that of the London scheme with, colour and 
monochrome cameras, data communication infrastructure, automatic 
number plate reading technology, a data centre, a billing and payment 
gateway, a bill notification system, and enforcement. As in London, the 
data captured through the system is utilised so as to identify vehicles 
accessing the charging zone, and necessary charges are computed based on 
established rates, taking account of the exemptions as provided for in the 
law. A direct link to the national vehicle registration database allows for 
vehicle ownership to be verified. While the scheme was expected to be self-
financing and one that would generate additional revenue, the current 
charges, as they stand do not generate much surplus revenue.   
 
Between the period May 2007 and August 2009 the system had charged a 
total of €2,125,826, nearly a million a year (Times of Malta, 2009). This does 
not compare well with the revenues generated by the previous V-licence 
which amounted to €1.4million in 2004 (Attard and Ison, 2010). In a recent 
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public speech the Transport Minister was quoted saying that “the CVA 
isn‟t working properly—I think it‟s too cheap” (Schembri, 2010). This 
shows the Government‟s intentions to increase the charges to make the 
system more efficient in deterring people to travel to Valletta by car. 
 
The Smeed Requirements and Valletta Road Pricing 
 
Having outlined the Valletta road pricing scheme (CVA) this section aims 
to compare the scheme with the Smeed Requirements. A comparison of the 
nine requirements and the Valletta scheme can be seen in Table 1. 
 
Taking each of the requirements in turn: 
 
Use made of the road 
 
The Smeed Report (UK Ministry of Transport, 1964) clearly indicated the 
need for a charge which reflected road usage. Whilst in many systems 
around the world this does not happen (the case of London‟s Congestion 
Charging is one example), Valletta‟s CVA system charges according to time 
spent inside the zone. Although not necessarily driving on the roads, the 
system records the time a car spends on the road within the zone and 
charges accordingly.  
 
If a vehicle is registered to be utilizing private space within the zone, such 
as a private garage then the car is exempt from payment as it is seen not to 
utilize public road space (at least whilst standing). 
 
Variation in price both spatial and temporal 
 
This criterion is partly met in the case of the Valletta CVA system. There is 
no variation in cost wherever you are in the charging zone since it would 
have not been feasible to differentiate according to place. The reason for 
this is that the CVA zone is an area of less than 0.8km2, as shown in Figure 
3. There are however variations in the costs associated with various types 
of vehicles and time of entry.  
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Table 1 
The Smeed Requirements and Valletta Road Pricing 
Smeed Requirements Valletta Road Pricing Scheme 
Charges should be closely 
related  the amount of use 
made of the roads 
Although the charge is not directly related to the use of 
the road, the charge is however time-based in that the 
first half an hour is free, the second half hour is €0.82 and 
each hour following is charged €0.82. There is a 
maximum charge of €6.52. 
It should be possible to vary 
prices to some extent for 
different roads, at different 
times of day, week or year, 
and for different classes of 
vehicle 
Prices vary according to the time spent in the zone, time 
of day (charging times during weekdays are between 
0800-1800 and on Saturday between 0800-1300), different 
days of the year (public holidays and Sundays are free), 
and exemptions allow for different classes of vehicles to 
be charged accordingly. 
Prices should be stable and 
readily ascertainable by 
road users before they 
embark upon a journey. 
Prices are available online and are fixed to particular 
times of day ensuring drivers are aware of the charge 
prior to undertaking the journey. 
Payment in advance should 
be possible. 
System allows for pre-payment (with a 10 per cent 
discount to encourage automatic debit), and a number of 
methods for payment. 
The incidence of the system 
upon individual road users 
should be accepted as fair 
A range of exemptions aimed at ensuring fairness, these 
include exemptions based on residency, support for the 
commercial community, emergency, senior citizen‟s 
relatives, motorcycles, and electric vehicles.  In addition 
residency is determined through the amount of hours a 
vehicle spends during night time (0200-0500). So 
residency is attached to the vehicle not to the person. 
The method should be 
simple for road users to 
understand 
Negative feedback was not registered upon the 
implementation. The advertising, the straightforward 
billing system (including automatic access to photographs 
and customised bills), customer care and the payment methods 
all made the system simple for road users to understand. 
Any equipment used 
should possess a high 
degree of reliability. 
The Contract between Government and Operator requires 
a 96 per cent reliability rate from the Operator. 
It should be reasonably free 
from the possibility of fraud 
and evasion 
There is no evidence of fraud or evasion recorded by the 
system. 
It should be capable of 
being applied, if necessary, 
to the whole country 
Technology is flexible enough to be implemented 
countrywide, particularly with the decreasing prices and 
size of camera technology. In Valletta the system was 
already planned to be extended further. 
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Figure 3 
The Controlled Vehicular Access Zone and Location of Cameras  
Source: http://www.cva.gov.mt/en/CVA_boundary_map.html 
(as accessed on 21 February 2010). 
 
These charges apply to usage by non-registered (exempt) users. Table 2 
displays the exemptions and discounts available to various types of users 
and vehicles. Even though not perfectly in line with the interpretation of 
the Smeed Report the CVA system allows for price variations in the case of 
vehicle type and its use and time (related to exemptions from payment). 
Most of the above exemptions, such as the exemptions on construction 
vehicles, doctors, deliveries and so on are aimed to remove the burden of 
the CVA system on both residents and businesses that would be at a 
disadvantage when compared to other commercial centres in the island, in 
that they would have to incur higher costs of living and operation. 
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Table 2 
Exemptions and Discounts in the CVA System  
Type of User/Vehicle Description of Exemption 
Resident‟s vehicles. Fully exempt however vehicle needs to 
satisfy a minimum criterion of being in 
the zone for a specified number of nights, 
between 0200 and 0500, every month. 
Non-resident vehicle with 
access to private 
garage/parking space. 
Exempt upon payment of an annual fee 
of €46.55. 
Service vehicles for works 
(mostly related to 
construction vehicles). 
Exempt during the period of works. 
Service vehicles for deliveries. Exempt during non-charging hours and 
between 1300 and 1600 during weekdays. 
Vehicles owned and used by 
disabled persons working in 
Valletta. 
Provided with an annual credit of €46.50 
to be utilized to access Valletta. Above 
this credit normal charges apply. 
Vehicles owned by relatives 
of residents over the age of 
61. 
First generation descendant are fully 
exempt. Where these do not exist up to 
two vehicles of other relatives will be 
exempt from the charges upon payment 
of an annual charge of €46.55.  
Vehicles owned and used by 
the Valletta market hawkers.  
Exempt during market hours and 90 
minutes before and after opening and 
closing times. 
Vehicles used by service 
providers such as in the 
electricity, drainage, water, 
and communications sectors. 
Exempt from the charges upon payment 
of an annual charge of €46.55 for each 
vehicle entering the zone. 
Vehicles used by medical 
practitioners in Valletta. 
Exempt from charges upon payment of 
an annual charge of €46.55. 
Vehicles used by the Police, 
emergency services and 
army. 
Exempt from charges. 
Adapted from http://www.cva.gov.mt/en/exemption_procedures.asp  
(accessed 21 February 2010). 
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Prices should be stable and readily ascertainable 
 
In the case of the Valletta CVA system, the information related to the 
charges and the charging zone are easily available and clearly understood. 
Bills are issued every month unless a threshold amount is not reached, in 
which case a bill is issued only after three months. Payment is to be effected 
within a month. In the first three years of operation the CVA system had 
only reported one incident when the public accused it of lack of 
information.  
 
When the first penalties for late payment were published in 2007, the 
general public was not made aware of the fees. In some instances the 
penalty was higher than the actual cost of the bill itself. The penalty 
charges for late payment, even though available on the website and in 
small print on each bill were not publicised enough to deter people from 
paying late. In the end the Government agreed to refund some late 
payments (Busuttil, 2007). 
 
Payment in advance 
 
The Smeed Report (Ministry of Transport, 1964) suggested that advance 
payment and credit facilities should be available. The CVA system allows 
for both.  The payment terms and penalties are described in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Payment and Penalties for the CVA System 
Description Payment / Penalty 
Payment before invoice (credit) 
and automatic debit 
10 per cent discount 
Payment at invoice 1 (full rate) 
Payment after 1 month after the 
invoice 
2 per cent of invoice or €5.82 (Lm2.50), 
whichever is the higher 
Payment after 2 months after the 
invoice 
Further increase of 2 per cent 
Payment after 3 months after the 
invoice 
100 per cent (amount due doubles) 
Adapted from http://www.cva.gov.mt/en/access_tariffs_and_penalties.asp  
(accessed on 21 February 2010). 
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Fairness of the system 
 
The concern over equity and fairness as perceived in the Smeed Report and 
as reported by Santos (2005) revolve around the payments made by the 
individual motorist and his/her ability to pay. The usage of road space and 
therefore the impact of that vehicle on the road and its environment are the 
same, whether coming from a relatively rich or poor motorist. The CVA 
system does not even identify the user but rather focuses on the vehicle 
itself with the system monitoring the vehicle usage trends over time 
(particularly in the establishment of residency).  In making the road pricing 
scheme fair many recognise the use of revenues as detailed above, as a 
possible means of making the system fair (see Jones, 1998), however the 
Government of Malta did not commit the revenues of the CVA system to 
particular projects. This move was a strategic one, in that the Government 
did not want to over-publicize the revenue generation aspect of the system 
and therefore be accused of implementing yet another tax. This is contrary 
to the approach adopted in London where the revenues were earmarked 
for public transport. 
 
On the other hand, the design of the CVA system could allow for the 
possibility of introducing the Smeed Requirement of fairness by 
differentiating between vehicle models, their engine size and fuel type. 
This could be achieved since the system is linked to the national vehicle 
registration database which holds all the information about the Maltese 
vehicle fleet (Mamo and Dalli, 2009). If the system had to evolve in this 
manner then pricing would not only be based on the relatively rich or poor 
car owners but also on their contribution to environmental pollution. This 
functionality could be the next evolutionary step for the CVA system.  
   
Simple to Understand 
 
Although the scheme is a relatively simple one, with all the information 
clearly described on a dedicated website, developed by the Operator 
(www.cva.gov.mt), there were and are still some drivers who are not aware 
of the details of operation, particularly with reference to charging hours, 
the specific charge, payment methods and exemptions. CVA Technology 
Ltd, the system operator handled 12,121 calls at its customer service centre 
between May and December 2009 compared to the same period in its first 
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year of operation (2007) where 13,208 calls were received at its offices (Gatt, 
2010). It is very difficult to gauge how simple the system is based only on 
the information available, as this would suggest that the operational 
information is clearly defined and therefore simple to use. However in real 
terms there are still many that do not have the full picture. 
 
Reliability 
 
In its call for tenders issued in 2005 the Maltese Government stipulated that 
margins of error of more than 5per cent related to the identification of vehicles 
entering and leaving the Charging Zone shall not be acceptable (Government of 
Malta, 2005). This provided guidelines for interested operators to ensure 
their systems were reliable. Today, the CVA system operates at 96—98.5 
per cent accuracy (Sacco, 2009). This includes the reading of the cameras 
and the manual checks carried out by the operators reviewing the data 
captured. 
 
Free from the possibility of fraud and evasion 
 
Given that the system is operated using cameras, enforcement is carried out 
instantly with offenders (or late payers) being fined according to penalty 
provisions in the law. In other more serious cases of infringement picked 
up by the system, such as use of a vehicle with an invalid vehicle 
registration number place or the case of recidivists, the Police are 
immediately notified. On the other hand the system also supports police 
investigations when vehicles are stolen or involved in crime. The number 
of contestations has consistently reduced following the first year of 
operation. Figure 4 shows the percentage decline. 
 
Capable of being applied nationally  
 
The CVA system is designed in a manner that is expandable to other areas 
or the whole island if necessary. The 2005 call for tender required 
interested parties to submit annual prices for the Valletta scheme, a lump 
sum for the expansion of the system to include Floriana (Figure 5) and the 
cost of additional camera locations. The intention of the Government, at the 
time, was evidently that of expanding the system in the future. 
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Figure 4 
Change (%) in the Number of Contestations: May 2007 - November 2011 
 
Source: CVA Technology, 2013. 
 
Figure 5 
The Extension of the CVA System to Floriana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Government of Malta, 2005 
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Figure 6 
CVA System Images 
 
Dealing with those Entering from Abroad 
 
In the case of Malta it is much harder to manage foreign number plates as 
details of those number plates might not have been included in the national 
vehicle registration database. Unless registered in the system foreign 
number plates are read by the system but are currently not charged. 
  
As an island however Malta has a relatively low percentage of foreign 
number plates and therefore the overall impact is minimal. In addition 
vehicles with a foreign number plate driven by Maltese nationals can only 
remain in circulation for a very limited time period (20 days) before 
compulsory registration with the Maltese authorities and the vehicle is 
issued with a local number plate (and therefore registered in the database). 
In the case of foreigners driving vehicles with foreign number plates, the 
vehicle can be legally used on Maltese roads for a maximum period of 
seven months (Government of Malta, 2009a; 2009b) before compulsory 
registration with the Maltese authorities. Given the geography of the island 
and the limited access to the European mainland such occurrences are 
limited.  
 
Road User Privacy 
 
With the exception of some references on local 
newspapers to the protection of individual‟s 
privacy, the CVA system was never officially 
investigated by the Data Protection 
Commissioner to be in violation of driver or 
individual privacy. The call for tender stipulated 
very clearly that the Operations had to comply 
with Data Protection Regulations. The system 
currently holds images for nine months after 
payment in order to process and verify payment 
particularly by credit card (MaltaToday, 2010) 
and images are only available to individuals 
upon online registration for the purpose of validating bills (Figure 6 ― 
author‟s vehicle). Any access to personal data is prohibited unless the 
Contracting Authority (i.e. Government) gives permission. This is generally 
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the case when the Police require information related to criminal 
investigations. 
 
Integration of Technology  
 
The CVA system is designed to manage and bill entries into and out of the 
charging zone. The billing relies on paper or electronic bills issued and sent 
to individuals on a monthly basis. Online payments, SMS and web 
notification are all integrated into the current system however the Contract 
does not foresee any further development within this Contract period (until  
2017). 
 
Lessons for others Considering the Implementation of a Road Pricing System 
 
Following the Smeed Report requirements and the subsequent 
implementation of the Valletta road pricing system there are a number of 
lessons which would appear to be of relevance to those authorities 
considering the implementation of a scheme. Essentially: 
 The system should be easy to understand. 
 The system should be transparent, providing users with all the 
information they need prior to their journeys. 
 The system should be reliable and credible and as such minimizing 
fraud and evasion. 
 The system should be flexible however this should not preclude a user 
friendly interface. 
 The system could be extended, if and when required.  
 The system should be adaptable to the changing needs of the authorities 
and type of controls or restrictions to be placed. 
 The system should be fair. The exemptions method, although 
cumbersome on the system itself due to the various permutations, 
should be used to incorporate fairness and equity as much as possible 
without affecting the basic principles of road pricing. 
 As seen in the case of Valletta, the system should not be intrusive both 
on the individual (in terms of privacy) and the environment, 
particularly in sensitive, historic areas.  
  
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These requirements would certainly match those of other schemes 
implemented elsewhere. It is also evident that despite the geographic 
differences of the various places where road pricing has been implemented 
their success is based on achieving a system that is fair and easy to 
understand and operate. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The Smeed Requirements would appear to be as valid today as they were 
in 1964. In the case of Valletta a few requirements are not fully satisfied but 
these are areas which future schemes would need to consider, including 
the developments of the Valletta system itself.  
 
Even though Valletta did not predicate its system on the Smeed Report, 
there is a surprising similarity in the way the system was implemented and 
how the various Smeed requirements have been incorporated. This 
similarity supports the validity and importance of these requirements for 
road pricing to be successfully implemented. And, even though road 
pricing schemes are not common and geographically very distinct, there 
are important lessons to be learnt and important considerations to be made 
when contemplating road pricing schemes. 
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